Property, intangible

a blog about ownership of intellectual property rights and its licensing

  • Unintended Consequences

    It may make business sense to put ownership of related trademarks in different subsidiaries.  Under In re Wella, one can generally register similar marks owned by sibling companies, as long as it’s done properly.

    But In re Koolatron Corp. discloses a risk I hadn’t thought about before, that is, that the registrations won’t serve the function of preventing the registration of the same or similar marks. How is that, you say?

    Miracle Exclusives, Inc. owned three trademarks for juicers and related products, MIRACLE PRO, MIRACLE ULTRA-MATIC and THE MIRACLE JUICER.  In March, 2004 it assigned two of them, MIRACLE ULTRA-MATIC and THE MIRACLE JUICER, to Miracle Products, LLC.  In December, 2007 it assigned MIRACLE PRO to Miracle Specialty Products, Inc.  (A fourth mark, MIRACLE MILLENNIUM JUICER, was not considered for purposes of the appeal, since it is about to be cancelled. Something is very confused about the “Miracle” assignments, as evidenced here, but it is not relevant to my topic.)

    There examining attorney refused register of the applied for mark, MIRACLE BLENDER, on the basis that the mark was likely to be confused with the “Miracle” juicer marks and another registration for MIRACLE KITCHEN PLUS for slicers, shredders and choppers.  The examining attorney argued that there were really only two registrants for the cited marks, claiming that the two “Miracle” companies were really one entity.

    Not so, says the TTAB:

    There is absolutely no evidence that Miracle Exclusives, Inc., Miracle Products LLC and Miracle Specialty Products are the same or closely related entities. Contrary to the examining attorney’s contentions, we must treat these entities as entirely independent. The fact that the original registrant assigned its registrations to different entities and, therefore, that the cited registrations are owned by three different entities, must be considered in determining, below, the strength or weakness of the respective marks.

    . . . .

    There is no doubt that all of these five marks are somewhat similar to each other. However, we find that, in view of the weakness of the respective marks and the coexistence on the Register of four MIRACLE marks owned by three entities for the same or closely related goods, the differences between applicant’s mark and each of the cited registered marks are sufficient to permit their coexistence on the Register.

    Would it have been different if the four senior marks were owned by two entities instead of three?  Maybe not, but maybe.

    In re Koolatron Corp., Ser. No. 76692281 (TTAB Sep. 28, 2010).

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  • The Things You Need a License For

    Yesterday I visited the Penland Gallery, an outstanding craft gallery associated with the Penland School of Crafts.  There were several large moving mechanical sculptures that the viewer was invited to activate.  Except this one:

    “PLEASE DO NOT HANDLE.  THE ARTIST IS THE ONLY ONE LICENSED TO OPERATE THE BUBBLE MAKER.”

    There was no commercial bubble maker involved here; it was just made of assembled found parts. (The gallery allows photography as long as the photos weren’t reproduced on the internet, so out of respect for the gallery’s rules I did not take a photo of the work.) I’m intrigued that we’ve become so sensitized to ownership of rights that, rather than a simple “please do not touch,” operating the sculpture is characterized as a licensed right. And a license granted by the artist to herself, no less. Hope the license is assignable.

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  • And the Answer Is . . . .

    I recently posed the question “Who owns the ‘Walter Mercado’ mark, Mercado or Bart Enterprises?” Did you say “Mercado”?  That’s the right answer, according to two different courts, despite the several references to “irrevocable.”

    In the first suit, Bart Enterprises and others brought the usual complement of state law claims when parties have a falling out, including trademark and copyright infringement claims against Mercado for his resumed use of the assigned copyrighted materials and trademark. The court distills it this way:

    The Agreement defines the “Term” as “in perpetuity . . . subject to the provisions of paragraph 12 hereinafter.”  Paragraph 12 of the Agreement gives both Bart and Mercado the right to terminate the Agreement under certain circumstances and using certain procedures. Plaintiffs assert that the right to termination under paragraph 12 would not terminate the assignments and transfers because paragraph 13 states that “[s]ubject to the terms of this agreement, all grants granted or assigned by this agreement shall be irrevocable under all or any circumstances, and shall not be subject to rescission, termination or injunction.” (emphasis added).  Despite Plaintiffs’ assertions otherwise, this clause, through the phrase “subject to the terms of this agreement,” does make the grants and assignments revocable under certain circumstances, namely a party’s exercise of his rights under paragraph 12.  Thus, based on the plain language of the Agreement, the Term of the Agreement ends if Bart or Mercado exercise their rights to terminate the Agreement under paragraph 12. Upon termination by either Bart or Mercado, the assignment of materials, transfer of rights in the materials, and the assignment of the trademark would revert back to Mercado because the Term would end.

    So does “irrevocable” actually accomplish anything?  I think it does – it means that the only way to undo the assignment of the trademark is to terminate the agreement, which can only be done in narrow circumstances. In fact, the termination provision was so difficult that after two tries and two lawsuits, Mercado has been unsuccessful and Bart still owns the mark.

    In the first suit, Walter International Productions, Inc. v. Mercado Salinas, Marcado claimed that Bart had failed to pay fees and tried to formally terminate the agreement by letter.  Bart said that it was not in arrears and that Mercado breached the agreement by failing to appear for scheduled appearances.  A jury held that the contract had not been terminated and the court therefore entered judgment that Bart still owned the copyrights and trademarks. The decision is on appeal.

    Mercado then demanded payment of $675,000 within fifteen days, which Marcado claimed was the amount due under Paragraph 6 of the agreement. Fifty-seven days later, after Bart didn’t pay, Marcado declared his intent to terminate the agreement as provided by Paragraph 12 of the agreement and sued Bart Enterprises three days later.  Here are the relevant terms of the agreement:

    6.  Mercado’s Services.

    * * *

    (c) Compensation.

    Bart agrees to pay Mercado, in consideration of all services rendered by Mercado and the use of the results thereof and all rights granted by Mercado to Bart, the following compensation . . . .

    12.  Termination.

    (a) Right to termination.

    (i) Bart shall have the right to terminate this Agreement immediately (A) in the event of a material breach by Mercado which remains uncured for a period of ten (10) days following written notice thereof; (B) if judicial proceedings are filed or instituted against Mercado, which Bart reasonably believes may impact upon the reputation or integrity of Mercado, or have an impact upon Mercado’s ability to perform its duties hereunder.

    (ii) Mercado shall have the right to terminate this Agreement immediately (A) in the event of a material breach by Bart which remains uncured for a period of ten (10) days following written notice thereof; (B) if judicial proceedings are filed or instituted against Bart, which Mercado reasonably believes may impact upon the reputation or integrity of Bart, or have an impact upon Bart’s ability to perform its duties hereunder.

    (iii) Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, if Bart fails to make any of the above mentioned payments, in paragraph 6(c), within sixty (60) days from the due date, then Mercado shall have the option to declare this contract null and void and all payments already made on the part of Bart shall be retained by Mercado, provided Mercado gives Bart written notice at least fifteen (15) days prior to such date of termination and Bart fails to cure the non-payment within such time period or otherwise can justify its failure to make such payment.

    There was no dispute that since November, 2006 both parties had failed to perform under the terms of the agreement.  On trademark ownership, the second court agreed with the first, both on the basis of issue preclusion and independent analysis that the trademark rights would revert to Marcado upon termination of the agreement.  So what was the problem this time?  Paragraph 6 conditions payment on Mercado performing services, which he had ceased doing.  Bart was therefore excused from payment and the agreement was not “null and void” under the termination provisions of paragraph 12(a)(iii):

    Because Mercado has rendered no services to Bart under the Agreement since November 2006, Defendants need not tender payment to Mercado. Bereft of a proper basis for termination under paragraph 12, Mercado has once again failed to nullify the Agreement. Accordingly, it appears to the court that Mercado’s assignment of rights to Bart remains in effect and that Defendants, not Plaintiffs, hold rights in the Mark.

    Rather than preliminary injunction ordering Bart not to use the “Walter Mercado” mark, Mercado is enjoined on a cross-motion. 

    I believe the decisions are correct. The agreement clearly made it difficult to terminate; there was no fixed term and no termination for convenience.  That’s pretty basic stuff and I would assume that the omission was deliberate. The trademark would only revert to Mercado – effectively prohibiting him from using his name except under the auspices of Bart – if the agreement was terminated.  It would appear Mercado and Bart carefully made the agreement pretty bullet-proof and it worked.

    Walter Int’l Prods, Inc. v. Mercado Salinas, No. 07-20136-CIV-Seitz/O’Sullivan (S.D. Fla. Nov. 24, 2008).
    Mercado-Salinas v Bart Enter. Int’l, Ltd., No. 09-1509 (D.P.R. Sept. 27, 2009).

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  • Is It Really “Irrevocable”?

    Construe this contract, applying Puerto Rican law:

    2.  “Walter Mercado” Mark.

    * * *

    (b) Mercado hereby irrevocably assigns to Bart throughout the Territory during the Term, all right, title and interest in and to the Mark, together with that part of the goodwill of Mercado’s business connected with and symbolized by said Mark, for use in connection with the Pre-existing Materials and the New Materials, if any.

    (c) Without limited the breadth of the rights granted in this paragraph, Bart shall have all rights in the Mark which are afforded to owners of trademarks and service marks, including but not limited ot the right to seek and obtain trademark protection and/or registration of the Mark in its name, and the right to enforce or defend Bart’s rights against third parties.  Mercado shall cooperate fully with Bart in Bart’s exercise of any of the rights granted hereunder.

    * * *

    4. Territory.

    The territory shall be the universe (the “Territory”).

    5. Term.

    The term of this Agreement shall be in perpetuity (the “Term”), subject to the provisions of paragraph 12 hereinafter.

    * * *

    12.  Termination.

    [Requirements for termination.]

    (b) Effect of Termination.

    [No mention of trademark.]

    13.  Remedies.

    Subject to the terms of this agreement, all grants granted or assigned by this agreement shall be irrevocable under all or any circumstances, and shall not be subject to recission, termination or injunction.  In the case of breach of this agreement by Bart, Mercado’s sole remedy shall be limited to an action at law for damages. 

    The parties each allege the other breached the terms of the contract.  Assume Mercado terminates the agreement in accordance with the terms in paragraph 12.  Who owns the mark?

    Full agreement here.  Court’s decision later.

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  • When Do You Exist?

    Once I did some legal research on unincorporated associations. How do you know when you have one? Is your regular Friday night poker game an unincorporated association?  (My aunt played poker with the same people for 50 years – surely that was an unincorporated association.) What about when members change, what happens then? When does one association become two?

    Administrative Judges Bucher, Cataldo and Wolfson were probably thanking their lucky stars that the TTAB is a venue of limited jurisidiction so they didn’t have to figure it all out. Nitelife of Santa Barbara v. Nite Life Car Club Association is a hot mess, so much so that the Board admitted:

    We find that traditional concepts of priority, likelihood of confusion, first use dates, implied contracts, uncontrolled licensing, abandonment of the mark, etc., are of little help in resolving this dispute.

    Wow, that’s all the stuff it DIDN’T decide.

    What we have is a car club – an unincorporated association – for low riders and antique cars that started in 1980 in Santa Barbara, named Nitelife of Santa Barbara. This group, the opposer, sponsored car shows, dances, and fund-raising events for community organizations. The logo was adopted in 1980:

    The club used all SORTS of iterations of “Nite Life,” with and without the logo:

    Here’s my personal favorite, the car club’s own ad that spells its name wrong:

    In 2003 or 2004, one or more members of the Santa Barbara club decided to hold meetings in Ventura.  As an unincorporated association, “Nite Life Car Club of Ventura County” got an Employee Identification Number (EIN) from the IRS, it had a seller’s permit issued by the Sales and Use Tax Department of the California State Board of Equalization, and member Edmundo Rosas was issued a fictitious business name statement for the name “Nite Life Car Club of Ventura County” and “Nite Life.”  (Just to keep things interesting, the association filed the trademark application in dispute in the name of “Nite Life Car Club Association.”)  There was conflicting evidence in the record about whether the Ventura members quit the Santa Barbara club.

    The opposition is against the third effort to register the mark. The first attempt was an application filed by one of the members of the Santa Barbara club, Daniel Trejo (“not the Hollywood actor!” adds the TTAB), for the above crossed-swords logo. It was opposed by Mr. Rosas of the Ventura club; Mr. Trejo defaulted so the application was abandoned.

    Then it was Ventura’s turn. The Ventura unincorporated association filed an application for the word mark “Nite Life” for “clothing sold only by the applicant’s association, namely . . . .” The application was opposed by Santa Barbara, but the opposition was dismissed for failure to prosecute and the mark registered.

    Finally, Ventura filed a use-based application for the crossed-sword logo for apparel, claiming a first use date in 1980 (the date the Santa Barbara club first used the logo) :

    This time Santa Barbara successfully opposed the application. I take the Board’s reasoning to be that the application failed because the applicant didn’t satisfy the requirements of 1(a), in particular that no other person have the right to use the mark, that the applicant have actual use of the mark, and that the first use date be accurate.  But the Board had a lot to say about the whole situation:

    Applicant’s claiming 1980 as its first date of use of the applied-for mark is a literal impossibility. As documented in this record, applicant’s uses of the words NITELIFE and the crossed dagger logo a score of years later (and an equal number of years after opposer’s adoption) should not in any way create for applicant its own mark with its own first use date, i.e., ownership of this substantially identical source indicator. We find, on this record, as a matter of trademark law, that opposer, Nitelife of Santa Barbara, is the owner of, at the very least,11 the crossed dagger logo –- irrespective of applicant’s irrelevant charge that opposer cannot produce a copyright from the artist. Despite the fact that the Santa Barbara group adopted its mark in 1980 and has demonstrated continuous use since then, Edmundo Rosas has set up “Nite Life Car Club Ventura County” and litigates to wrest opposer’s ownership right away from the Santa Barbara group -– a group that has been decidedly less successful than the Ventura group in recent litigation before this tribunal.

    In some filings herein, Mr. Rosas and his group seem to suggest that the Santa Barbara and Ventura groups are co-owners of these trademarks and service marks. Under this theory of ownership, Mr. Rosas apparently has concluded that the parties, together, could grow the organization by searching out more NITELIFE chapters across Central California, if not throughout the rest of these United States. However, when not arguing for a “live-and-let-live” attitude toward opposer, Mr. Rosas and his counsel have the temerity to claim exclusive use for the new Ventura group over these disputed marks, while denying such rights for their former compatriots in the Santa Barbara group.

    In conclusion, we find that applicant is not the exclusive owner of the crossed dagger logo; that there is little credible evidence applicant ever used the applied-for mark for the identified goods;[*] and that applicant could not possibly have used its applied for mark as early as 1980. We do not reach the questions of priority/likelihood of confusion or whether applicant has intentionally offered material misrepresentations in its dealing with the United States Patent and Trademark Office or this Board.

    11 As noted above, we are constrained by the presumptions afforded applicant under Section 7 of the Lanham Act in holding that opposer holds exclusive trademark rights to the words “Nite Life.”

    * Bonus text, by a clearly vexed Board: “Other than the application specimens, the record contains no documentary evidence of applicant’s bona fide use of the mark on clothing items in International Class 25. Moreover, in reviewing applicant’s responses to opposer’s discovery requests, this Board found itself as annoyed as was opposer with circuitous, run-on sentences of meaningless but turgid prose mashed into long, non-responsive answers.”  Example here.

    Hey, it’s a cool logo though.

    Nitelife of Santa Barbara v Nite Life Car Club Ass’n, Opp. No. 91188462 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 30, 2010).

    HT to John Welch at The TTABlog.

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  • An Invalid Assignment Isn’t Incontestable

    I’m not even going to try to outline the convoluted competing ownership claims to the STOLICHNAYA trademark for vodka – you can read the decision for that.  But the disagreement about who owned the mark led to a trademark infringement suit that plaintiff Federal Treasury Enterprises Sojuzplodoimport (FTE) brought against the record owner of the mark Spirits International N.V., et al. in 2005.  The district court dismissed almost all claims on a motion to dismiss, holding that the incontestable status of the registration meant that FTE couldn’t challenge ownership. 

    A registration of a trademark that is incontestable is

    conclusive evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the registrant’s ownership of the mark, and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce.

    Lanham Act § 33, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b).  Since a registrant includes “the assigns” of a registered mark, Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127, the district court reasoned that an owner by assignment after the mark became incontestable stepped into the shoes of the previous owner, thus making its ownership claim also incontestable.

    But not quite, says the Court of Appeals. It’s only after a valid assignment that one succeeds to the rights of the assignor. Thus, one has to look at the standard for challenging the validity of the assignment.  “When the prescribed information reporting the assignment is recorded in the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the record shall be prima facie evidence of execution.”  Lanham Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 1060. The PTO doesn’t examine the assignments for validity, merely records them as a ministerial act.  FTE may therefore challenge the validity of the assignment:

    If the mere fact that the registrant satisfied the requirements for incontestability could preclude FTE’s claim, then incontestability would transform recording–a ministerial act–into a mechanism for conclusively defeating allegations (which must be credited on a motion to dismiss) challenging the legality of the assignment. Defendants’ statutory interpretation would lead to a perverse result in cases such as this, where all parties agree that the trademarks became incontestable in 1974, but the disputed assignment comes from a series of transactions that occurred many years later.

    Defendant Spirits International also failed on its argument that the validity of the assignment agreement was a state law issue, not federal, and therefore couldn’t be heard in federal court. This appears to be new ground to be trod by an appeals court, although the Second Circuit handily found that the federal court has jurisdiction based on a similar conclusion in copyright cases.  FTE had alleged Lanham Act causes of act for which ownership was a predicate, so the federal court has jurisdiction to decide the underlying ownership claim.
     ,
    Federal Treasury Enter. Sojuzplodoimport v Spirits Int’l N.V., No. 06-3532 (2d Cir. Oct. 8, 2010).
    Federal Treasury Enter. Sojuzplodoimport v Spirits Int’l N.V., No. 04-cv-8510 (S.D.N.Y. March 31, 2006).

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  • Check the Corporate Records – Every Time

    Litigation is expensive and the last thing you need is unnecessary motion practice.  On June 16, 1998 an inventor employed by patent owner Tri-Star executed an assignment to “Tri-Star Electronics International, Inc., its successors, legal representatives and assigns,” an Ohio corporation. On September 9, 1999, he executed another assignment to Tri-Star as an Ohio corporation.  Problem?  A few days after the first assignment, Tri-Star was changed through merger to a California corporation. Here comes the motion to dismiss for lack of standing.

    No one could believe that the inventor didn’t mean to assign the patent to his employer, no matter where the company was formed.  But in litigation, any chink in the armor has to be defended.  Luckily for Tri-Star, Ohio law

    instructs that the primary objective of contract interpretation “is to give effect to the intent of the parties, which we presume rests in the language that they have chosen to employ.”

    The parties – the inventor and Tri-Star – intended that he assign the patent to the currently existing corporation and the word “successor” gave effect to the intent. District court denial of motion affirmed.

    Tri-Star Elecs. Int’l, Inc. v. Preci-Dip Durtal SA, No. 2009-1337 (Fed. Cir. Sep. 9, 2010).

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  • When Can You Assign an Intent-to-Use Application?

    Test your knowledge of Section 10 of the Lanham Act!  Here’s the set-up:  Joint owners file an intent-to-use application.  One owner assigns the mark to the other before the mark is used.  Improper assignment of an intent-to-use application or not?

    TTABlog has the answer.

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  • Due Diligence Matters

    Pacific Coast Trailers, LLC v. Cozad Trailer Sales, LLC is a tale of failed due diligence.

    Reliance Trailer Manufacturing Corp. (“Reliance Mfg.”) owned the trademarks RELIANCE, STURDYWELD, ALLOY and COMET. It assigned the latter three, but not RELIANCE, to a sibling company, Reliance Trailer Co., LLC (“Reliance LLC”). Reliance LLC defaulted on some loans and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. It listed the RELIANCE trademark as an asset on its bankruptcy schedule.

    Defendant Cozad purchased any interest that the lending bank, Sterling, had in the Reliance LLC assets. The Bill of Sale listed the purchased assets as

    without warranties of any kind, all of [Sterling]’s right, title and interest, if any, in (1) the trade names ‘Reliance Trailer,’ ‘Sturdy Weld,’ ‘Alloy Trailers,’ and ‘Comet Trailers’ and the word mark ‘Sturdy Weld’.

    The bank then assigned the marks STURDYWELD, ALLOY, and COMET to Cozad, but not the RELIANCE mark.

    Almost simultaneously, Reliance Mfg. granted an exclusive license to use the RELIANCE mark to plaintiff Pacific Coast. The agreement was signed three days after Cozad purchased its rights from Reliance LLC. Pacific Coast sued Cozad one day later in state court.

    This is really a no-brainer – preliminary injunction granted against Cozad’s use of RELIANCE. A few sentences is all it took:

    The Court finds that Pacific Coast has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. First, Pacific Coast holds “an exclusive, royalty bearing right and license” to use the RELIANCE name, which it obtained from the presumed owner of the RELIANCE trademark, Reliance Mfg. Thus, Pacific Coast can likely prove it obtained a valid, protectable interest in the RELIANCE trademark.Second, Cozad’s use is likely unauthorized. Cozad attempts to rebut Reliance Mfg.’s presumed ownership by claiming that it purchased from Sterling all the assets and goodwill listed in Reliance, LLC’s bankruptcy schedule, which included the RELIANCE mark. Although a trademark may be validly assigned by sale or operation of law via bankruptcy, a transferor cannot convey any more interest than he or she has. But for the fact that the RELIANCE mark was listed in Reliance LLC’s bankruptcy schedule, there is no evidence that Reliance LLC (or Sterling) ever owned or obtained any interest in the RELIANCE mark. Furthermore, the fact that Sterling assigned to Cozad the marks for STURDYWELD, ALLOY, and COMET but not RELIANCE indicates that Sterling is at least uncertain whether it owned any interest in the RELIANCE trademark in the first place. If Sterling never owned any interest in the mark, it could not have transferred any interest to Cozad. Thus, Cozad has failed to rebut the presumption that Reliance Mfg. owns the RELIANCE trademark and could properly license it to Pacific Coast.

    But the case is really a lesson in due diligence and gamesmanship.  An email from Cozad’s CPA shows Cozad thought it was getting the RELIANCE mark:

    (Full email here.) Uh, no. The PTO assignment database shows that only three were assigned, clearly showing that  neither Reliance LLC nor Sterling owned the RELIANCE mark.

    Meanwhile, Pacific Trailer was also after the mark.  A declaration submitted on behalf of Pacific Coast Trailers in a co-pending California suit between the parties says:

    Pacific Coast Trailers made several offers to purchase Reliance Trailer Co. LLC assets from Sterling but ceased doing so when it reached an agreement with Cozad regarding a subsequent transfer of substantially all of the assets from Cozad to Pacific Coast Trailers, such agreement now being the subject of [the Washington] lawsuit.

    So at some point Pacific Coast Trailers figured out that the RELIANCE mark, at least on paper, hadn’t been assigned and took a license from the record owner, then sued Cozad for trademark infringement in Washington. Meanwhile, Cozad sued Pacific Coast Trailers for trademark infringement in California. Pacific Coast Trailers then successfully obtained a preliminary injunction against Cozad.

    But these things have a way of working themselves out.  The preliminary injunction was only pawn to queen four and the game continues. Since the decision, Reliance Mfg. was somehow motivated to terminate the license for the RELIANCE mark to Pacific Coast and sold the mark to Cozad.  Cozad then dismissed the Reliance parties from the California suit and has moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction in the Washington action.

    That’s a lot of trouble, money and time spent because the assignment database wasn’t checked carefully enough.

    Seattle Trademark Lawyer post here.

    Pacific Coast Trailers, LLC v Cozad Trailer Sales, LLC, No. CV-10-111-EFS (E.D. Wash. Sept. 1, 2010).

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  • Is “Waji” Confusingly Similar to “Uwajimaya”?

    Uwajimaya, Inc. claims that its business is known by the diminutive “Waji” and that it orally (uh-oh) licensed the Waji mark to Defendant Concourse Concessions LLC.  Concourse Concessions apparently begs to differ on ownership, having successfully registered “Waji” in its own name.  Which doesn’t explain its pending effort to register “Uwajimaya” too.  Currently its application to register the above depicted mark with “Uwajimaya” in it is refused on the basis of likelihood of confusion with the plaintiff’s registration.  Oh, six days later it filed a new application for a very similar mark without the word “Uwajimaya.”

    Full rundown on the complaint by The Seattle Trademark Lawyer here.

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